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INTRODUCTION

Drug prices in the United States are too high, and Americans are
suffering as a result. President Obama made attempts to combat this
issue,2 and currently, President Trump has vowed to bring prices
1. I am grateful to my family and friends for all their love, support, and encouragement
throughout law school and the drafting of this Article. I am also thankful for Professor Frederick M. Abbott's insight, expertise, and advice, without which this Article would not have
been written. Lastly, I would like to thank Hannah Rodgers, Lauren Pettine, and the rest of
the Florida State University Law Review editors for their hard work in editing this Article.
2. Noam N. Levey, Obama Administration Proposes New Effort to Combat High Drug
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down.3 A recent poll indicated that over 70 percent of Americans are
in favor of allowing importation of drugs to lower these prices.4 This
Article argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Impression Products v. Lexmark along with new drug safety regulations present the
Trump Administration with the ideal opportunity to keep its promise
by introducing competition into the patented drug market.
In short, this Article proposes a statutory change and cooperation
between U.S. and EU authorities that will sanction parallel importation of patented pharmaceuticals in limited circumstances, which
will bring much needed competition into the monopolized patented
drug market. The suggestions will allow these pharmaceuticals to be
traded under the current drug safety regulations, ensuring that
Americans will be able to purchase the same safe medicines they take
now, but at lower prices.
Part II of this Article explores the issue of high drug prices in the
United States, which presents the need for parallel importation. Part
III gives general background information necessary to understand
the patent issues confronted in Lexmark and discusses the impact the
Court's holding could have. In Part IV, the Article delves into the
potential influence parallel importation could have on the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. market.
Part IV analyzes the current regulatory scheme for the sale of
pharmaceuticals in the United States, detailing new drug safety
and tracing requirements that the Food and Drug Administration
has implemented. Additionally, Part V discusses U.S. consumer's
abuse of the current system that further demonstrates the need for
change. In Part VI, the Article suggests a slight statutory change to
the existing law and an agreement between U.S. and EU agencies,
which would carve out a meaningful exception for parallel traders.
The exception's main purpose would be to curtail the abuses of the
current system and lower drug prices for struggling Americans.
Lastly, in Part VII, the Article examines the road blocks to successfully implementing a parallel pharmaceutical trade (PPT) system in
the United States.

Prices, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-drug-prices-20160308story.html [https://perma.cc/D3UD-B3YA].
3. Paul R. La Monica, Trump Vows to BringDrug Prices 'Way Down', CCN MONEY (Mar.
7, 2017, 12:49 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/07/investing/president-trump-drug-priceshealthcare/index.html [https://perma.cc/E7Y7-B22X].

4. Bianca DiJulio, Jamie Firth & Mollyann Brodie, Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: August 2015, KKF (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-healthtracking-poll-august-20 15/ [https://perma.cc/G6CM-QWAL].
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THE ISSUE OF HIGH DRUG PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES

Pharmaceutical prices in the United States are astronomical and
are steadily rising. Since 1993, drug costs have increased 303 percent.5 To put this number into perspective, let us briefly explore the
prices of drugs meant to treat a particular disease: cancer. After adjusting for inflation and expected survival benefits, the initial prices
of novel, patented cancer drugs in the United States steadily rose ten
percent a year from 1995 to 2013.6 The market entry price for patented cancer drugs in the United States is consistently in excess of
$100,000 per patient/treatment and that price can skyrocket to
$400,000 for certain orphan drugs.7 Often times patients will require
multiple treatments, too.
These alarming numbers have not gone unnoticed. Several expert
oncologists coauthored an editorial protesting the outrageous prices.8
In particular, the piece argues that the prices consumers have to pay
for cancer treatments do not reflect a fair price for the benefits they
receive from the drugs.9
High prices are not solely a national problem-the issue persists in
every country and is worsening with the development of new drugs. In
a study comparing the prices of a new Hepatitis C medicine in thirty
countries of varying wealth, researchers found that "the total cost of
treating all patients with hepatitis C [within the countries] would be
equal to at least a tenth of the current annual cost for all medicines in

5. INST. FOR HEALTH & SOCIO-ECON., MARCHING TOWARD MONOPOLY- MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 1 (2016) [hereinafter IHSP: MONOPOLY],
https://www.nationalnursesunited.org/sites/default/files/nnu/files/pdf/research/

MarchingTowardMonopoly-PharmaMAlO-17-16.pdf.
6.

Patricia M. Danzon, Affordability and Accessibility to Medicines in EMs: Differential

Pricing is the Solution, ISB INSIGHT (June 1, 2016), http://isbinsight.isb.edu/affordabilityand- accessibility-to-medicines-in-ems-differential-pricing-is-the-solution/

[https://perma.cc/

ND4H-L8CH].
7. Id. For background on what constitutes an "orphan" drug, see Designatingan Orphan
Product: Drugs and Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
Forlndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/HowtoapplyforOrphanProductDesignation/default.htm [https://perma.cc/ATP9-MG78] ('The Orphan Drug Act (ODA)
provides for granting special status to a drug or biological product ('drug') to treat a rare
disease or condition upon request of a sponsor. This status is referred to as orphan designation (or sometimes 'orphan status'). For a drug to qualify for orphan designation both
the drug and the disease or condition must meet certain criteria specified in the ODA and
FDA's implementing regulations .... Orphan designation qualifies the sponsor of the drug
for various development incentives of the ODA, including tax credits for qualified clinical
testing.").
8. Experts in Chronic Myeloid Leukemia, The Priceof Drugs for ChronicMyeloid Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the UnsustainablePricesof CancerDrugs:from the Perspective

of a Large Group of CML Experts, 121 BLOOD J. 4439 (2013).
9. Id. at 4439.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

200

[Vol. 46:197

all of the countries studied."'o Despite this issue's global reach, the
United States has far and away the highest pharmaceuticals prices in
the world." This was evident in the Hepatitis C study, which found that
U.S. prices for both products evaluated were considerably higher than
in countries with equivalent GDP per capita than the United States,
such as the United Kingdom. 2

Breaking the issue down reveals that newly patented pharmaceuticals are priced far higher than generic or off-patent drugs. 3 The patent
rights on these "brand name" drugs are almost always held by the company that "originates" the drug. An "originator" is a company that develops a drug and is first to receive approval from health authoritiesthe Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States-to market the drug to the public.1 4 Upon receiving approval from the FDA and
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, originators receive a period of
market exclusivity and patent rights." Patent rights usually last for
twenty years from the date of filing. During this period the FDA cannot
approve generic equivalents to the patented drug, unless the patent is
invalidated or the generic drug does not infringe the patent. 6 Thus, the
originator is granted a monopoly over the pricing of the new drug, because nobody else can produce or sell the product.
While there have been outstanding price increases in both generic
and patented drugs, 7 the pricing of patented drugs has leveled the
10. Swathi Iyengar et al., Prices, Costs, and Affordability of New Medicines for Hepatitis C in 30 Countries: An Economic Analysis, 13 PLOS MED. 1, 3 (2016) (emphasis added),
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10. 1371/journal.pmed. 1002032
[https://perma.cc/FRU3-VSLH].
11. FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY:
ENSURING MEDICINES FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD 22 (2009); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim et

al., The High Cost of PrescriptionDrugs in the United States Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 860 (2016).
12.

Iyengar et al., supra note 10, at 10.

13.

For an explanation of the differences between a patented and a generic pharmaceu-

tical, see Erik Mogalian, What's the Difference Between Brand-Name and Generic Prescription Drugs?, SCI. Am. (Dec. 13, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/whats-thedifference-betw-2004-12-13/ [https://perma.cc/9P85-GFBZ] ("The major difference between a
[patented] pharmaceutical and its generic counterpart is neither chemistry nor quality, but
whether the drug is still under patent protection by the company that initially developed it.
When a company develops a new drug, it typically receives a patent that lasts 20 years. This
means that other pharmaceutical companies may not sell this substance without permission
from the developing company during that time.").
14.

ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 11, at 19.

15. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 860. For more discussion on market exclusivity, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-201, BRAND-NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRICING: LACK OF THERAPEUTICALLY EQUIVALENT DRUGS AND LIMITED COMPETITION MAY
CONTRIBUTE To EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES 5-6 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter GAO: BRANDNAME PRICING], https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299848.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP9V-2DKL].
16.

GAO: BRAND-NAME PRICING, supra note 15, at 5 n.10.

17.

IHSP: MONOPOLY, supra note 5.
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biggest impact. Generic producers often have a higher volume of sales,
but patent holding originators make much higher revenues." To illustrate, in 2007, worldwide pharmaceutical sales reached approximately
US$650 billion, where roughly US$550 billion of these sales came from
patented products. 9 The brunt of this has been felt in United States,
which "has the highest originator pharmaceutical prices in the world
and contributes the largest share of originator industry revenues."20
Contrary to almost all other advanced nations, the United States
permits manufacturers to set their own prices for pharmaceuticals. 2
Without direct regulatory oversight of pricing and protection from
competition via patent rights, U.S. originators have been free to set
the prices of patented pharmaceuticals as high as they please.
Another aspect that adds fuel to the originators' pricing power is
the relatively inelastic demand for drugs. 22 For most nonessential

products, if the price increases greatly, consumers will likely stop buying them. As convenient and entertaining as Netflix is, most people
would not subscribe to it if its price rose from $10 a month to $100 a
month. On the other hand, pharmaceuticals are necessities, rendering
them inelastic as their prices increase. Even when pharmaceuticals
make tenfold price jumps, 23 people must continue to buy them.
The evidence establishes that patent holders have taken advantage
of the lack of competition, minimal price controls, and unwavering demand. U.S. originators have charged high prices in the United States,
18.

ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 11, at 22.

19. Id.; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals:Trade Therapy
for Market Distortions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXHAUSTION
AND PARALLEL IMPORTS 145, 151 (2016) [hereinafter Abbott, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals] ('As of 2015, aggregate global revenues from sales of pharmaceutical products should
exceed U.S.$1 trillion. Generic drugs will account for about U.S.$300-350 billion of that total. Yet, the volume of generic drugs in international trade far exceeds the volume of patented drugs.").
20. Frederick M. Abbott, Inside Views: US Supreme Court Adopts International Exhaustion For Patents: Paving the Way for ParallelImports to Exert Downward Pressure on
Domestic Pharmaceutical(and Other) Prices, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 31, 2017) [hereinafter Abbott, Inside Views 1], https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/05/31/us-supreme-courtadopts-international-exhaustion-patents-paving-way-parallel-imports-exert-downwardpressure-domestic-pharmaceutical-prices/ [https://perma.cc/4CJE-UM64]; PHARMACEUTICAL
PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES, IMPLICATIONS FOR AM. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RES.
AND DEV., AND INNOVATION BEFORE THE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR AND PENSIONS 4
(2005) [hereinafter PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS], https://www.help.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Aldonas-SenHELP-Rx-2-17-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/AEK7-RX66] (testimony
of Grant D. Aldonas) ("We found that patented drugs that were best sellers in the United
States sold for less in other OECD countries.").
21.

Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 860.

22. See PharmaceuticalPricing and Reimbursement and the Broader Pharmaceutical
Policy Environment, in OECD HEALTH POLICY STUDIES: PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING POLICIES
IN A GLOBAL MARKET 97 (2008).
23.

GAO: BRAND-NAME PRICING, supra note 15, at 10-15.
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while blatantly charging foreign nations much less for the same product. 2 4 This price discrimination is evident in various studies. A study
conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce found that among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries, the aggregate pharmaceutical prices were anywhere
from 18 percent to 67 percent less than prices charged in the United
States.2 5 What these numbers fail to demonstrate is the real-life impact that this greed has on U.S. citizens. Politicians and news outlets
have tried to bring this to light.2 6

Clearly, action must be taken to drive down the prices of patented
pharmaceuticals. One solution would be to increase competition in the
market. You might be wondering-and for good reason-how competition can be increased when originators have patent rights over the sale
of the product. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Impression Products v. Lexmark may provide relief in this area.
Prior to the Lexmark decision, there was uncertainty about whether
the sale of a patented product in a foreign country exhausted the U.S.
patent owner's rights in the patented product. The Court in Lexmark
unequivocally adopted a rule of international exhaustion of patent
rights.27 In doing so, it has presented legislators and rule-makers with
the opportunity to crack open the door for parallel importers to add
competition to the market.2 8 This Article argues that in limited circum-

stances, importers should be able to purchase FDA approved drugs on
24. See Panos Kanavos et al., Higher U.S. Branded Drug Prices and Spending Compared to Other Countries May Stem Partly from Quick Uptake of New Drugs, 32 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 753 (2013); James Paton & Naomi Kresge, Why the $600 EpiPen Costs $69 in Britain, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-29/epipen-s-69-cost-in-britain-shows-other-extreme-of-drug-pricing-itnvgvam;
Robert Langreth
et al., The U.S. Pays a Lot More for Top Drugs Than Other Countries, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18,
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/Y78M-HG3P].
25. PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS, supra note 20, at 4.
26. See Ali Velshi et al., PrescriptionPrice Crisis? 28 Million Americans See Spike in
Drug Prices, NBC NEWS (June 11, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/
consumer/prescription-price-crisis-28-million-americans-see-spike-drug-prices-n7702 91
[https://perma.cc/FEF6-PLRH]; Bernie Sanders, High Drug Prices Are Killing Americans,
HUFF. POST (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/bernie-sanders/high-drugprices-are-kill b_8059526.html [https://perma.cc/9GYB-MA6L]; Liz Szaboa, Drug Costs
Soar, People Delay or Skip Cancer Treatments, NPR (March 15, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/03/15/520110742/as-drug-costs-soar-peopledelay-or-skip-cancer-treatments [https://perma.cc/8E66-J2YL]; Joseph Walker, Patients
Struggle With High Drug Prices, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
patients-struggle-with-high-drug-prices- 1451557981 [https://perma.cc/Y556-UTUZ].
27. Under a rule of national (rather than international) exhaustion, a U.S. originator
who sold its drug in a foreign market would preserve the right to sue for infringement if a
company attempted to buy the foreign drug and resell it in the United State. Inhibiting this
trade allows the patent holder to sustain a competition-free market. See infra Part V.
28. For a definition of parallel importation, see Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.C. Lai,
ParallelImports and Price Controls, 39 RAND J. OF ECON. 378, 378 (2008) ("Parallel trade

2019] BATTLE AGAINST HIGH PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES

203

the foreign market at low prices and resell them in the United States.
Sanctioning the sale of parallel imported drugs at cheaper prices
would undercut the high prices originators charge. Allowing PPT in
United States will not be a complete solution to the drug price crisis;
however, it will start to push prices in the right direction-down.
III. PATENT EXHAUSTION & THE LEXMARK DECISION
A.

Background

This brief section provides general background information necessary to understanding the patent issues confronted in Lexmark and its
potential impact on pharmaceutical prices. The chief purpose of the
patent system is to function as an incentive for individuals to do something they would not have done otherwise, such as "invent, disclose,
commercialize, or design around."2 9 To create this incentive, the Patent

Act grants patentees the "right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the[ir] invention[s] ."30 A patentee can defend and enforce these rights in an infringement action. Such actions
provide patentees with the ability to secure injunctions and/or recover
monetary damages for violations of the rights.31
A patentee's exclusionary rights over a patented product is not
boundless. Significantly, the rights are limited by a valid sale of the
patented item. 32 When a patentee chooses to sell an item, the purchaser becomes the owner of that product and gains the rights and
benefits of ownership. Consequently, the sale terminates or exhausts
the patentee's right to exclude others, including the purchaser, from
using or selling that item. 33 This exhaustion of rights is often referred
occurs when a good protected by a patent, copyright, or trademark, having been legally purchased in one country, is exported to another without the authorization of the local owner of
the intellectual property rights in the importing market.").
29. Kieff F. Scott, The Case for RegisteringPatents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-ObtainingRules 8-9 (Harvard Law and Economics, Discussion Paper No. 415,
2003), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=392202 [https://perma.cc/4HNU7D64].
30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012). Note that this exclusion right is restricted to "whatever
product or process is covered by the patent's claim or claims. Thus, for example, patents do
not interfere with other governmental efforts to restrict use, such as to mitigate environmental impact." Scott, supra note 29, at 9.
31. See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007).
32. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (discussing the termination of rights upon a sale of a patented product).
33. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531 (2017); see also
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electrs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008). A sale will not result
in a patent owner losing all rights associated with their patent. Notwithstanding an authorized sale, a patentee will "retain[] his right to exclude purchasers of the articles from making
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as the "first sale" doctrine; its main purpose is to limit the patentee's
monopoly over a patented article in an effort to facilitate the free movement of patented goods in the market .4
The first sale doctrine was well-established in U.S. case law prior
to the Lexmark decision. As such, it is well-known that when a U.S.
patentee sells his or her product within the United States, the patentee no longer has patent rights to exclude activities such as resale,
ordinary use, or repair of the article. 3 5 Despite the rule's long history,
there was much uncertainty about whether the first sale of a patented
product in a foreign country exhausted the patentee's rights in the
United States; and, whether post-sale contractual restrictions entered
into by the patentee and a purchaser of the product preserved the
rights that would otherwise be exhausted by such a sale. 3 6 In Impression Products v. Lexmark, the Supreme Court set out to answer these
pressing questions.
B.

Lexmark

The respondent in this seminal decision was Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark), a company that designed, manufactured, and
sold toner cartridges globally. 37 The company held various patents covering cartridge mechanisms and how they are used. 38 When these cartridges ran out of toner it was easy for competitors to refill and sell
them again. 3 9 Fully aware of this issue, Lexmark developed a business
model attempting to stifle resale competition. 4 0 It gave buyers two options: 1) purchase a "Regular" cartridge at full price that was not subject to any restrictions; or 2) purchase a "Return Program" cartridge
at a discount, subject to the contractual restriction that the buyer
the patented invention anew." Amelia Smith Rinehart, ContractingPatents:A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 484, 484 n.4 (2010). Thus, when this Article
refers to the exhaustion of patent rights, it refers only to the rights of restricting sales or
uses of products that have been sold by the patentee, not the right to restrict others from
creating the patented product.
34. Rinehart, supra note 33, at 484; see also Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1531
("For over 160 years, the doctrine of patent exhaustion has imposed a limit on that right
to exclude.").
35. Rinehart, supra note 33, at 484-85; Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1529-31 (noting
that the rule is "well-established" after discussing and citing cases which solidified the rule).
36. Compare Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding that sales made outside the United States were outside the reach of exhausting U.S.
patent rights), with Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that post-sale restrictions preserved some patent holders' rights despite an authorized
sale).
37. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1529.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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would not reuse the cartridge and would not transfer the cartridge to
anyone other than Lexmark after the toner ran out.4
Despite Lexmark's efforts, remanufacturers continued to successfully buy, refill, and resell both types of cartridges. 4 2 In reaction,
Lexmark brought patent infringement claims against several remanufacturers, including the petitioner, Impression Products, Inc. (Impression), regarding two groups of cartridges. The first group were Return Program cartridges that Lexmark sold within the United States. 4 3
Lexmark argued that the remanufacturers infringed the patents regarding this group because of its express prohibition against reuse and
resale. 4 4 Lexmark based its infringement argument for the second
group-consisting of cartridges Lexmark sold abroad that were subsequently imported into the United States by remanufacturers-on the
fact that it never gave anyone the authority to import the cartridges. 45
In response, Impression maintained that both infringement claims
were invalid, because Lexmark's sale of the cartridges, both abroad
and in the United States, exhausted Lexmark's patent rights. 46
The Court held that Impression was not liable for patent infringement, finding that the post-sale restrictions Lexmark placed on the
"Return Program" cartridges did not give rise to patent rights, and
that the lawful sale of the cartridges aboard exhausted Lexmark's patent rights within the United States. 47 In reaching this decision, the
Court was faced with two major issues: 1) whether a patent holder that
sells an item with express resale and reuse prohibitions may enforce
the restrictions through an infringement action; and 2) whether a patentee exhausts its patent rights by selling its product outside the
United States. 4 8
In addressing the first issue, the Court concluded that post-sale
contractual provisions had no effect on the exhaustion of Lexmark's
41. Id. at 1529-30. Patent owners are often well aware of the limitations of patent rights
after an authorized sale. Consequently, patentees will place post-sale restrictions in their
sales contracts with purchasers, just as Impression did with the Return Program cartridges.
This is done in the hopes of recovering damages in a legal action based on contract law if the
first sale doctrine restricts them from recovering based on a patent infringement claim; see
Rinehart, supra note 33, at 495-97; see also infra Part VII.C.2.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1530.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

47. Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Inc.: Will International Patent Exhaustion Bring Free Trade in Patented Goods, PATENTLYO (June 1, 2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/06/impression-international-exhaustion.html
[https://perma.cc/

M55C-9AKY].
48. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1529.
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patent rights. 4 9 The Court noted that the single-use/no-resale restrictions in the customers' contracts may have given Lexmark enforceable rights against the customers under contract law; however,
the provisions in no way enabled Lexmark to preserve patent rights in
the items.o
In resolving the second issue, the Court firmly embraced a rule
of international exhaustion. Making it clear that "[a]n authorized
sale outside the United States, just as one within the United States,
exhausts all rights under the Patent Act." 5'The Court reasoned that
adopting the rule of international exhaustion was "straightforward," considering that international exhaustion is applied to copyright protections.5 2
Notwithstanding the Court's ease in reaching its conclusion on
international exhaustion, the ruling has enormous implications.
The opinion applies to all patents, and its impact will not be limited
to the pharmaceutical industry; it will have far reaching implications for all U.S. consumers and affect virtually every industry. 53
The opinion, as commentators have noted, certainly leaves questions unanswered. 5 4 The remainder of this Article will focus on the
effects the opinion could have on the pharmaceutical sector. Specifically, it will explore the opportunities that the decision presents for
arbitrage of patent pharmaceuticals.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1531.
Id.
Id. at 1535.
Id. at 1536.

53. See Abbott, Inside Views I, supra note 20; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Inside Views:
US Supreme Court Adopts InternationalExhaustion OfPatents (PartII): Addressing the New
Competitive Landscape, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Aug. 06, 2017) [hereinafter Abbott, Inside
Views Il], http://www.ip-watch.org/2017/06/08/us-supreme-court-adopts-internationalexhaustion-patents-part-ii-addressing-new-competitive-landscape/
[https://perma.cc/M9TUXADM] ("The decision has wide-ranging effect. Importers of computers and cellphones that
are produced with components lawfully sourced outside the United States no longer must be
concerned about attempts to block resales through patent-owner infringement actions.").
54. See Rajec, supra note 47, at 2 ("[T]he opinion leaves open some questions about
international trade in patented goods. Some are legal and will likely spur further litigation
(e.g., whose authorization is required for an 'authorized sale abroad' to occur?) while others are empirical and still speculative (e.g., with geographic price discrimination off the
table, what other methods will businesses pursue for price discrimination and control of
downstream sales?"); see also Gene Quinn, Patent Exhaustion at the Supreme Court: Industry Reaction to Impression Products v. Lexmark, IPWATCHDOG (May 30, 2017), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/30/patent-exhaustion-supreme-court-industry-reactionimpression-products-v-lexmark/id=83822/ [https://perma.cc/6JVA-XW7F].
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PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET

'

The pharmaceutical industry is, by any measure, highly regulated,
and justifiably so." Unlike industries with minimal regulatory barriers, parallel importation of pharmaceuticals cannot take place in the
United States without an analysis of, and changes to, the current regulatory scheme. Before moving on to this legal analysis, it is critical to
further understand the need for such importation-in short, how will
it drive prices down.
The establishment of international exhaustion aligns U.S. patent
law with free trade principles and will likely spark competition by
reducing barriers to trade." When a patentee completes a valid sale
of its product abroad, international exhaustion nullifies the patentee's ability to claim infringement when a competitor resells that
product in the United States.17 This will stifle a patent holder's ability to participate in geographic price discrimination between the
United States and foreign markets. If the Lexmark decision triggers
a move toward parallel importation of pharmaceuticals, it will result
in the originator industry losing some control over setting prices for
patented pharmaceuticals."
A pharmaceutical patent holder will no longer have the ultimate
right to determine the selling price of its product other than upon its
initial sale. 9 Thus, if the patent holder chooses to sell its drug at a low
price point in a foreign country, that drug may be resold at a low price
within the United States.6 0 As noted, price discrimination is rampant,
and U.S. consumers are often the ones most affected by it.6
Patent rights create an atmosphere of minimal to no competition.6 2
The U.S. Government Accountability Office views this lack of competition as a contributing factor to the "extraordinary" prices of patented
drugs. 63 Parallel importation is a tool that would introduce competition
into the market and may lead to a decrease in prices that the United
States so desperately needs.

55.

See generally ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 11.

56.

Rajec, supra note 47, at 1.

57.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.

58.

Abbott, ParallelTrade in Pharmaceuticals,supra note 19, at 151.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61. Abbott, Inside Views I, supra note 20 ('The US public stands to gain from the downward pricing pressure that may come from parallel imports of patented pharmaceuticals.").
62.

See Lemley, supra note 31.

63.

GAO: BRAND-NAME PRICING, supra note 15, at 16.
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Economic models concur that parallel importation will result in
originators lowering prices of the product for the importing country
and increasing prices in the country which they are exported from (assuming that the exporting country had lower prices prior to the parallel importation). 6 4 As result, U.S. originators may need to raise prices
in foreign markets and lower prices in the United States in order keep
up with new competition from parallel imports; this should bring the
market towards more uniform global prices for patented pharmaceuticals. 65 If the price of the drug is higher in the U.S market than in a
foreign country, U.S. consumers will benefit by receiving new, lowered
prices.66
Some have vehemently argued that sanctioning parallel trade will
cripple the originator industry's ability to fund research and development
(R&D), which will decrease the number of new drugs being invented.6 7
There is evidence that suggests otherwise. First, large originator companies have shown that-even without the pressure of parallel importsR&D is not one their top priorities.6 8 "There is a considerable lack of transparency in pharmaceutical R&D investment, but the available data indicate that only about 10% of drug sales go towards R&D on new products." 69 Indeed, many large originator companies have shifted their focus
away from R&D, instead relying on mergers and acquisitions (1V&A) to
acquire the rights to newly invented drugs.7 0 Rather than spend revenue
on R&D to invent new drugs or treatments, these companies have opted

64. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Oullette, Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 24-26 (2016) (discussing in
the introduction how the United States almost always has higher prices than foreign countries); Catalina Bordoy & Izabela Jelovac, Pricing and Welfare Implications of ParallelImports in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 5 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 5, 7 (2005).
65. See Martin Richardson, An Elementary PropositionConcerningParallelImports, 56
J. OF INT'L ECON. 223 (2002); David Malueg & Marius Schwartz, ParallelImports, Demand
Dispersion, and InternationalPrice Discrimination, 37 J. INT'L ECON. 167 (1994); Brief for
Professor Frederick M. Abbott as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Impression
Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189) [hereinafter Brief for
Professor Abbott].
66. Brief for Professor Abbott, supra note 65, at 20; see also Bordoy & Jelovac, supra
note 64, at 6 ("We first confirm a result already reported in the literature: Parallel trade
makes the prices [of pharmaceuticals] converge.").
67.

JACOB ARFWEDSON, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, RE-IMPORTATION (PARALLEL

TRADE) IN PHARMACEUTICALS: POLICY REPORT 182, at 6 (2004), https://www.ipi.org/docLib/
PR182-ParallelTrade.pdf-OpenElement.pdf.
68. See INST. FOR HEALTH & SOCIO-ECON. POLICY, THE R&D SMOKE SCREEN: THE
PRIORITIZATION OF MARKETING & SALES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2016) [herein-

after IHSP: SMOKE SCREEN], https://nurses.3cdn.net/e74ab9a3e937fe5646_afm6bhOu9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FBR-DFHV].
69. Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Frameworkfor Global HealthcareR&D,
2 PLOS BIOLOGY 147, 148 (2004) (emphasis added).
70. See IHSP: MONOPOLY, supra note 5.

2019] BATTLE AGAINST HIGH PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES

209

to purchase smaller firms that have invented a new drug through their
own R&D departments. Once the transaction is complete, the combined or remaining company's R&D funding is cut substantially.'
Second, almost all of the top pharmaceutical companies spend
more on marketing and sales (M&S) than on R&D by a large margin-a majority spend over twice as much on M&S. 72 Notwithstanding the debates of the ethics of advertising prescription drugs directly
to consumers, 73 it seems that U.S. citizens cannot watch ten minutes
of cable television without seeing a commercial for a prescription
drug. The numbers show that this advertising certainly is not
cheap. 74 In the event that parallel imports result in a decrease of originator revenue, the amount spent on M&S demonstrates that there
are plenty of funds that companies could reallocate to ensure the
same level of investment in R&D.7 5
Moreover, even if the originator industry decides to apportion less
funds to R&D, it may not result in a decrease of newly invented drugs.
A substantial source of pharmaceutical R&D funding comes from the
National Institutes of Health (NIH).7 6 It provides about $37.3 billion dollars for medical research annually, much of which is allocated to pharmaceutical R&D funding.77 This considerable and steady source of funding is unlikely to be affected by parallel imports, because the funds do
not depend on profitability of patented drugs. Lastly, if the originator
industry increases prices abroad, as the economic models predict, the
increased revenue from foreign sales could undoubtedly help the companies maintain the current level of R&D funding.78
Another argument launched against PPT is that it will not result
in meaningful benefits to U.S. consumers. A 2004 report by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) estimated that the
savings to the U.S. consumer would be modest in comparison to the

71.

Id. at 9.

72.

IHSP: SMOKE SCREEN, supra note 68, at 2-3.

73. See ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 11, at 183-89 (discussing how there are only two
countries in the world who allow direct-to-consumer advertising and noting the ethical issues
that accompany such advertising); see also R. Stephen Parker & Charles E. Pettijohn, Ethical Considerations in the Use of Direct-To-ConsumerAdvertising and PharmaceuticalPromotions: The Impact on PharmaceuticalSales and Physicians, 48 J. BUS. ETHICS 279 (2003).
74. IHSP: SMOKE SCREEN, supra note 68, at 4. From 2011-2015, a single originator (Novartis) spent over $60,000,000,000 on Marketing and Sales. Id.
75.

Brief for Professor Abbott, supra note 65, at 24.

76.

Id. at 24-25.

77. What We Do: Budget, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH
(APRIL 11, 2018), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/budget [https://perma.cc/
9KP3-9QX6].
78.

Brief for Professor Abbott, supra note 65, at 20.
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'

overall pharmaceutical industry.79 The HSS report found that if PPT
remedies the price discrepancy between the United States and foreign
jurisdictions, the benefit may not be fully felt at the consumer level,
because third parties-such as insurance companies and importers/exporters-will take a large portion of the savings.80 Since the report was
published, however, the gap between pharmaceutical prices in the
United States and foreign countries has increased.8
Additionally, globalization has made the cost of shipping goods less
expensive.8 2 It is likely that companies in the best position to step in
as parallel traders-companies such as Walmart, Costco, and Amazon,
which have specialized in this kind of trade for years-will have found
ways to reduce their costs since 2004. This could translate into parallel
importers taking a smaller percentage of the difference in prices than
the HHS Report estimated, and result in more savings trickling to the
consumer. Furthermore, as the Report notes, even if the savings to
consumers overall will be modest, the individuals most in need of relief
from high drug prices-the uninsured-are those most likely to significantly benefit from parallel imports. 83
To be clear, the discussion above does not go into great detail regarding the economic theory involved in determining the influence of
PPT. There is significant debate on the impact PPT will have on overall global welfare and on the full influence it will have on prices at the
consumer level.8 4 Despite the importance of economics to this debate,
an empirical study analyzing the exact financial impact is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, even assuming that parallel imports will

79. See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., HHS TASKFORCE ON DRUG IMPORTATION,
REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION 65-70 (2004) [hereinafter HHS TASKFORCE
REPORT], https://www.safemedicines.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HHS-Report1220.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SQW-3YZD].

80.

See id. at 65.

81.

See Kanavos et al., supra note 24, at 756-58.

82. See Deborah Abrams Kaplan, The Real Cost of E-Commerce Logistics, SUPPLY CHAIN
DIVE (June 6, 2017), https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/amazon-effect-logistics-cost-delivery/444138/ [https://perma.cc/DM6Y-SF4V] ("While shipping is costly for Amazon, the company is reducing its transportation expenses on a per package and per order basis every
quarter of every year. . . .").
83. HHS TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 79, at 67. ("[S]ome individuals may enjoy significant savings. Uninsured people who buy chronic use patented name-brand drugs on a
regular basis may enjoy meaningful savings if they are able to buy safe and effective foreign
versions of U.S. drugs . . . .").
84. For a more in depth economic analysis, see Grossman & Lai, supra note 28; see also
Jelovac & Bordoy, supra note 64, at 7 (finding that PPT's effect on welfare will depend on the
drug needs and health insurance policies of the countries involved as well as originators reactions to the introduction of parallel trade); Patricia Danzon, The Economics of ParallelTrade,
13 PHARMACOECONOMICS 293 (1998); Hemel & Oullette, supra note 64, at 27 ('[N]et winners
and losers from a U.S. international exhaustion rule are somewhat ambiguous . . . .").
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only have a limited impact on lowering U.S. pharmaceutical prices, it
would still be important progress.
The United States has the highest originator pharmaceutical prices
in the world." Frankly, any developments that alleviate prices are a
step in the right direction. Parallel trade will, at a minimum, loosen
the grip the originator industry has on patented pharmaceutical
prices. The importance of breaking up the pricing monopoly is clear.
The remainder of this Article will focus on the feasibility of implementing a successful scheme to do so.
V.

REGULATORY SCHEME AND CONSUMER ACTIONS UNDER THE
SCHEME

A.

Current InternationalLegal Scheme

The United States is not a party to an international agreement that
directly restricts parallel importation." The international legal
scheme and trade rules largely leave the legality of parallel importation in the hands of the importing country." The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), to which the United States is a party, demonstrates the deferential nature of international law regarding exhaustion and parallel importation.88 Article 6 of TRIPS, specifies that nothing in the Agreement "shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."89
Despite this language, some challenged the legality of the parallel
importation under TRIPS.90 In the late 1990s, the originator pharmaceutical industry launched a challenge to the South African government's authorization of PPT, arguing that TRIPS prohibited such activity.91 Stated simply, the issue in the case boiled down to whether

85. Abbott, Inside Views I, supra note 20.
86. Susy Frankel & Daniel J. Gervais, Internationalintellectualproperty rules and parallel imports, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXHAUSTION AND

PARALLEL IMPORTS 85, 92 (Calboli & E. Lee, Edward Elgar eds., 2016); Brief for Professor
Abbott, supra note 65, at 9.
87. Grossman & Lai, supra note 28, at 399.
88. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 86, at 92.
89. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 33 I.L.M. 81, 86 (1994); see also Frankel & Gervais,
supra note 86, at 92.
90. See Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the Committee on International
Trade Law of the InternationalLaw Association on the Subject of ParallelImportation, 1 J.
INT'L ECON L. 607, 609 (1998).
91. Abbott, ParallelTrade in Pharmaceuticals,supra note 19, at 146.
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South Africa's authorization of parallel importation violated TRIPS.9 2
The case was ultimately abandoned by the originator industry, who
chose to pay South Africa's legal expenses, but the answer to the issue
was clearly "no." 9 3 South Africa has since implemented the regulations
sanctioning PPT, and they are still in place today. 94
A lack of consensus on the issue of exhaustion at the international
level has led to a policy of deference to individual nations. International challenges to national laws accepting parallel importation have
not been successful, as evidenced by the South African example. Moreover, PPT has been successfully implemented for many years in the
European Union.95 Thus, there are no real international roadblocks to
the United States initiating legislation that fosters PPT. However, it
is not so clear cut at the domestic level.
B. FederalLegal Landscape
1.

Compliance with DrugApplications and the Ban on Reimports

All aspects of pharmaceuticals in the United States-from manufacture to sale-are regulated by the FDA. The origins of this authority
stem from the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), which
allows the FDA to regulate the import and export of pharmaceuticals.9 6
For starters, section 510 of the FDCA requires firms that manufacture,
prepare, propagate, compound, process, or import drugs in the United
States to register with the FDA.9 7 This requirement extends to companies even if they are solely repacking or relabeling drugs, which, as
discussed below, is fairly important in the context of PPT.98
The FDA enforces restrictions against the importation of any drug
that it has not approved through a new drug application (NDA). 99 Specifically, the FDCA prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 147.
95. PANOS KANAVOS ET AL., PARALLEL TRADING IN MEDICINES: EUROPE'S EXPERIENCE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL DRUG IMPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES i (2005),

https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/2005_07_trade.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4DQ-DGSX].
96. 21 C.F.R. § 314.410 (2017); Elliott A. Foote, PrescriptionDrug Importation:An Expanded FDA Personal Use Exemption and Qualified Regulators for Foreign-ProducedPharmaceuticals, 27 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 369, 377 (2015).
97. See 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2012).
98. Id.
99. Marvin A. Blumberg, Information on Importation of Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Apr. 3, 1998), https://www.fda.gov/Forlndustry/ImportProgram/ucml73751.htm [https://perma.cc/
2DCX-HZL3].
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of any "new drug" that has not been approved via an NDA.' 0 0 This justifiable prohibition of unapproved drugs has little negative impact on
PPT, because drugs that have not been approved cannot be sold in the
United States, regardless of whether they are imported. The following
restrictions have more of an influence on the potential for PPT.
If a drug does gain approval, the FDA prohibits versions of the drug
that do not meet the specifications of the NDA.' 0 ' Most drugs sold at
lower prices abroad are labeled for sale in that foreign country or region (such as the European Union); therefore, under the FDCA, anybody who buys the drug in a foreign market will need to relabel it with
the appropriate U.S. labels in order to sell it here. Moreover, "if a product is manufactured in a different facility from the facilities listed in
the NDA, or if it is manufactured according to different specifications,
it is considered an unapproved new drug-even if it is made by the
same company." 02 Essentially, imported drugs must fully comply with
U.S. labeling requirements and comport to any specifications (manufacturing facility or otherwise) within the NDA.1 0 3
Thus, the foreign version of an originator's pharmaceutical product
cannot be legally imported, even if the same originator retails an identical FDA-approved version to U.S. patients.'0 4 However, this would
not prohibit the importation of a drug manufactured in a foreign country if the labeling, manufacturing facility, and product complied with
the originator's NDA. 0 5
Lastly, the FDCA places a ban on re-importation of pharmaceuticals.'0 o For example, when a prescription drug is manufactured within
the United States and exported to another country, it cannot be imported back into the United States (unless it is being returned to the

100.

21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012); Erika Lietzan, Demystifying Drug Importationafter Im-

pression v. Lexmark, PATENTLYO (JUNE 6, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/06/
demystifying-importation-impression.html [https://perma.cc/KRX4-A54N].
101.

See Blumberg, supra note 99.

102.

Lietzan, supra note 100.

103.

Id.

104. Professor Lietzan provides a great example of this restriction in action. See id.
('Pfizer sells Viagra in the United States under an NDA that [the] FDA has approved. Pfizer
also sells Viagra in Europe. That drug is marketed pursuant to authorization by the European Commission on the basis of a separate marketing application that complied with European law. If the European product is made at a facility that is not listed in the U.S. application, or if it is manufactured according to different specifications, or if it is composed differently (different inactive ingredients for instance), then it cannot be imported into the United
States. Certainly it is labeled in accordance with European labeling rules, and the European
labeling is not the same as the FDA-approved labeling, so again it cannot be imported into
the United States.").

105.
106.

See infra Part VI.
21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (2012).
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original manufacturer).' Thus, if a drug is originally made in the United
States, re-importing it for sale on the U.S. market is prohibited.
2.

The Drug Supply Chain Security Act

More recently in 2013, the Drug Supply Chain Security Act
(DSCSA)'0 8 was added to the FDCA under which the FDA has implemented more rules that affect the potential for PPT.' 09 This Act and its
rules are meant to ensure the safety and quality of drugs as they change
hands before reaching U.S. patients."o Specifically, the regulations are
meant to certify that a drug sold to a U.S. consumer can easily be traced
back to when it was created, and that there is a record of who handled
the product prior to the consumer's purchase. The DSCSA defines each
of the actors involved in the drug supply chain, including manufacturers, repackagers, wholesale distributors, and dispensers."' Discussed
below, parallel traders will likely fall under the definition of repackagers and will have to be registered as such.
Each actor in the supply chain must be appropriately registered for
the activity it engages in and must only sell products to certain "authorized trading partners."" 2 For manufacturers, repackagers, wholesale distributors, or dispensers to sell or buy a drug from another
trader, the buyer must meet the requirements to be an authorized
trading partner.11 3 Manufacturers and repackagers seeking recognition as authorized trading partners "must have a valid registration in
107. Import Alert 66-14, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2014), www.accessdata.fda.gov/
cmsiaimportalert_177.html [https://perma.cc/FF3Z-NNL8].

108. 21 U.S.C
Security Act, U.S.

§

360eee (Supp. I 2013-2014); see Drug Supply Chain
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/

DrugIntegrityandSupplyChainSecurity/DrugSupplyChainSecurityAct/

[https://perma.cc/

4Q6V-XCAH].
109. See infra Part VI.
110. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., DSCSA STANDARDS FOR THE INTEROPERABLE
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TRACING OF CERTAIN HUM., FINISHED, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
HOW To EXCHANGE PRODUCT TRACING INFORMATION: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 1 (Nov. 2014),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm424895.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8LL-

AJW6] ("Section 582 was added by the Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) (Title II of
Public Law 113-54) and facilitates the tracing of products through the pharmaceutical distribution supply chain by requiring certain trading partners (manufacturers, repackagers,
wholesale distributors, and dispensers) to exchange transaction information, transaction
history, and a transaction statement (product tracing information) when engaging in transactions involving certain prescription drugs." (footnotes omitted)).

111.

21 U.S.C

§ 360eee

(Supp. I 2013-2014); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL.,

IDENTIFYING TRADING PARTNERS UNDER THE DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY ACT (2017)
[hereinafter FDA, IDENTIFYING TRADING PARTNERS], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM572252 .pdf [https://perma.cc/
89EG-ECDJ] (listing the code provisions which define each actor).
112.

See IDENTIFYING TRADING PARTNERS, supra note 111, at 3-5 (emphasis omitted).

113.

Id. at 2.
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accordance with section 510 of the [FDCA] and accept or transfer direct ownership of a product from or to a manufacturer, repackager,
wholesale distributor, or dispenser."11 4 Moreover, the regulations require each trading partner to have a system in place for identifying
suspect or illegitimate products and notifying the FDA and their trading partners when such a product is detected." 5
Most significantly, the DSCSA requires each trader to comply with
product tracing and identification regulations. Pursuant to the
DSCSA, the FDA has set in motion a multi-phase regulation plan that
obligates each trader to implement product tracing, product recognition, and information storing systems."
The regulations increase incrementally over a period of about 10
years; the plan is currently in the middle stages of implementation,
with the finalized regulations and guidance documents set to be completed by 2024."' Each phase creates more stringent and sophisticated
tracking procedures for the traders. The requirements seriously increase the complexity of the regulatory system; in fact, the added burden has caused some to fear that traders will fall out of compliance, at
least temporarily." 8
To better understand these requirements, it is easiest to start from the
beginning of the supply chain-manufacturers. In January 2015, the
FDA began requiring product identifiers to be placed on each lot or batch
of products introduced into commerce by a transaction (that is, any batch
that exchanges ownership)." 9 The identifiers are contained on a bar code,

114.

Id. at 3.

115. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY ACT
IMPLEMENTATION: IDENTIFICATION OF SUSPECT PRODUCTS AND NOTIFICATION: GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY (2016) [hereinafter FDA, DSCSA: IDENTIFICATION], https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM400470.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2HW-NEXC].
116. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY ACT (DSCSA)
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN [hereinafter FDA, DSCSA: IMPLEMENTATION], https://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DrugSafety/DruglntegrityandSupplyChainSecurity/DrugSupplyChainSecurityAct/
ucm382022.htm [https://perma.cc/9Wff-7V6L].
117.

Id.

118. Meg Snyder, Understanding Serialization Challenges: Tracelink Reveals Webinar
Survey Findings About How Companies Have Adapted to Lot-Level Requirements and
DSCSA SterilizationDeadlines, R&D (Dec. 15, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.pharmpro.com/
article/2016/12/understanding-serialization-challenges
[https://perma.cc/BLG9-RJVE]
('[M]ore than half of the companies are sending documentation to some (but not all) trading
partners and some were not able to address the requirements at all.").
119. Chris Souza, DSCSA: What PhaseII Implementation Means For You, TRACKTRACERx
(Apr. 3, 2016), http://blog.tracktracerx.com/dscsa-phase-ii-implementation-means/
[https://perma.cc/8MFM-S6R3]; Personal Importation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Forlndustry/ImportProgram/ImportBasics/ucm432661.htm
[https://perma.cc/SQF7-VYUT].
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but they must also be legible to humans.1o Beginning in November 2018,
manufacturers will be required to place an individual product identifier
on every "package and homogenous case."' 2 ' To those who are unfamiliar
with this industry it may seem very similar to the 2015 requirement, but
the November 2018 requirement is a much taller order.
For context, there may be a hundred thousand individual packages
in a lot, and the November 2018 requirement mandates that a distinct
serial number be placed on each one so that the package can be tracked
individually. 2 2 In addition to the product identifier, the National Drug
Code (NDC), expiration date, serial number, and lot number must also
be legible on the package.1 23 This serialization at the package level was
originally set to be enforced for products manufactured after November
2017, but the deadline was pushed back a year to allow industry members time to fully comply.1 24 This illustrates the added burden that package and homogenous case serialization places on traders. 2 5
Once the product is sold, the product identifiers must be utilized. In
January 2015, the regulations began requiring each trading partner to
utilize the lot-level product identifiers to capture, maintain, and provide
subsequent buyers with product tracing information when engaging in
sales. 126 First, "trading partners are required to provide the subsequent

120. See 21 U.S.C. § 360eee(14) (Supp. I. 2013-2014) (stating that a product identifier
in both human-readable form and on a machine-readacontains "a standardized graphic . .
ble data carrier").
121. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ETAL., PRODUCT IDENTIFIER REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE
DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY ACT - COMPLIANCE POLICY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2017)
[hereinafter FDA, PRODUCT IDENTIFIER REQUIREMENTS], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM565272.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SE2P-9NUG].
122. Souza, supra note 119.
123. Karla L. Palmer, Any Drug Manufacturer (or Repackager, Dispenser, and Distributor) Affected by the Looming Serialization Deadline in the Drug Supply Chain Security Act
Really Should Read This One, FDA L. BLOG (July 2, 2017), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
20 17/07/any-drug-manufacturer-or-repackager-dispenser-and-distributor-affected-by-thelooming-serialization/ [https://perma.cc/A9FW-CCEX].
124.

Id.

125. The regulations provide exceptions to the tracing requirements for products that do
not have tracing information because they were manufactured before the product identifier
requirements kicked in (before November 2018). This is referred to as the Grandfathering
policy. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., GRANDFATHERING POLICY FOR PACKAGES AND
HOMOGENOUS CASES OF PRODUCT WITHOUT A PRODUCT IDENTIFIER; GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
(2017) [hereinafter FDA, GRANDFATHERING POLICY], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM586509.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GN43-D4VZ].
126. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DSCSA IMPLEMENTATION: PRODUCT TRACING
REQUIREMENTS-COMPLIANCE POLICY (2014) [hereinafter FDA, DSCSA IMPLEMENTATION],
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/
UCM427867.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S9S-CVEK].
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purchaser with product tracing information." 2 7 Second, traders "are required to capture and maintain the applicable product tracing information" for at least six years after the transaction.'2 The product tracing information must be delivered electronically (bar code format), 29
and it is comprised of the transaction information (TI), transaction history (TH), and a transaction statement (TS).
The TI that trading partners must provide consists of ten distinct
elements: 1) Proprietary or established name of the drug; 2) strength
and dosage form of the product; 3) National Drug Code number of the
drug; 4) container size; 5) number of containers; 6) lot number of the
product; 7) date of the transaction; 8) date of the shipment (if shipment
occurs more than 24 hours after the date of the transaction; 9) business
name and address of the person from whom ownership is being transferred; and 10) business name and address of the person to whom ownership is being transferred.1 3 0 In March 2018, the FDA released a draft
guidance document to help ensure that traders are providing TI in a
consistent manner.13' The document gives some information on how
each of the ten elements should be displayed in an effort to standardize
the way traders deliver the TI.
Transaction history is separate from TI, but the March 2018 guidance provides direction to the industry on how to standardize TH as
well.1 32 TH should include the TI "for each prior transaction going back
to the manufacturer of the product. In general, the [TH] for a product
should be a compilation of the transaction information for each prior
transaction involving that product." 3 3 Traders can generate a single
document for the TH based on the information it collected from the
product's previous owner, with the product information for the current
transaction placed at the top of the document.1 34
Lastly, the trading partner has to provide a transaction statement
(TS) to the purchaser before or at the time of the transaction.1 35 The
TS must state that the entity transferring ownership is: 1) Authorized

127. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., STANDARDIZATION OF DATA AND
DOCUMENTATION PRACTICES FOR PRODUCT TRACING GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 2 (2018)
[hereinafter FDA, STANDARDIZATION OF DATA], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM598734.pdf
[https://perma.cc/

PW9C-LZYY] (citation omitted).
128. Id.
129. 21 U.S.C. § 360eee (1)(b)(1)(C) (Supp. I. 2013).
130.

See FDA, STANDARDIZATION OF DATA, supra note 127, at 6-9.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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to do so under the DSCSA; 2) has received the product from an authorized trading partner; 3) has received the TI and a TS from the prior
owner; 4) has not knowingly shipped a "suspect or illegitimate product"; 5) "had systems and processes in place to comply with verification
requirements under section 582"; 6) did not knowingly deliver false TI;
and 7) did not knowingly modify the TH.1 3 6 As of now, traders have to
provide the TI, TH, and TS for the batch or lot level, but the requirement, as discussed above, will graduate to the package level in the
near future.1 3 7
3.

Emergency and Personal Use Exemptions

There are exceptions to the FDA's current regulations. The first is
more of a discretionary choice, but its result is similar to that of an
exception. Section 384(j) of the FDCA gives the FDA "discretion to permit individuals to make .

.

. importations [if] .

.

. the importation is

clearly for personal use[] and the prescription drug or device imported
does not appear to present an unreasonable risk to the individual." 3 8
A drug is a personal importation if it is brought into the United States
and is not meant to be sold or distributed by the purchaser.1

39

This is

a discretionary provision, thus there is no absolute right to import
drugs for personnel use-and the FDA's stance on this could potentially change at any time.1 40
The FDA has released a set of criteria regarding situations for
which personal importation of a prescription drug might be allowed.141
It notes that the product must be for a serious condition with no effective treatment available domestically, and the quantity should not exceed a three months' supply.1 42 Some "Americans view the personal use
136.

Id.

137.

See Palmer, supra notel23.

138.

21 U.S.C. § 384(j)(1)(B).

139.

Personal Importation, supra note 119.

140. AARP, PRESCRIPTION DRUG RE-IMPORTATION QUESTION AND ANSWER SHEET,
https://assets.aarp.org/www.aarp.org_/articles/international/ReimportationQA.pdf

[https://perma.cclJA3Q-C9G4].
141.

FDA, STANDARDIZATION OF DATA, supra note 127, at 1.

142.

Id. at 2. The full set of criteria are as follows:

The product is for a serious condition for which effective treatment may not be
available domestically either through commercial or clinical means. There is no
known commercialization or promotion of the product to persons residing in the
U.S. The product does not represent an unreasonable risk. The consumer affirms
in writing that the product is for personal use. The quantity is generally not more
than a three month supply[,] and either: [p]rovide the name and address of the
doctor licensed in the U.S. responsible for your treatment with the product, or
[p]rovide evidence that the product is for the continuation of a treatment begun
in a foreign country.
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exception policy as a way to access lower prices for medicines already approved in the U.S." 4 3 However, the FDA makes clear that "the [personal
use exemption] is not intended to permit personal importation of cheaper
versions of FDA approved drugs from. . . foreign countries." 4 4
Secondly, section 801(d)(2) of the FDCA provides an exception for
importing a drug when authorized by the Secretary in the case of a
medical emergency.1 45 This medical emergency exception is construed
very narrowly, but it allows individuals to bring in medicines from
aboard into the United States for personal use in cases of serious medical emergencies.146
4. Abuse of the Current Systems and FailedAttempts
Over the years, abuse of these exceptions has become rampant. In
fact, "[by] one estimate, parallel imports of prescription drugs from
Canada amounted to $1.1 billion in 2004, or about 0.5% of the U.S.
market." 4 7 The FDA has certainly taken notice of the abuse. "[I]n the
face of organized trips [ofj seniors planning to buy drugs abroad and
the increase in Internet-based pharmacies, the [FDA] . . . indicated
that it will increase its prosecutions of' individuals exploiting these
provisions.148
Clearly, these provisions do not provide the relief that people need
from high drug prices, despite consumer attempts to use them as such.
Lawmakers have tried to address this issue with legislation sanctioning parallel trade, but these attempts have failed in the face of lobbying opposition and poor drafting.1 4 9 One such bill-the Medicine Equity

Id.
143.

AARP, supra note 140.

PERSONAL IMPORTATION POLICY, FDA GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/importsandexportscompliance/
ucm297909.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8AN-K9Z8].
145. Abbott, ParallelTrade in Pharmaceuticals,supra note 19, at 151 n.28.
144.

146. ATARA NOLADE, REGULATORY FOCUS, DRUG REIMPORTATION: IS IT THE SOLUTION TO THE
HIGH COST OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN THE US? 3 (2013), https://advanced.jhu.edulwp-content/

uploads/20 13/04/DrugReimportation-Noiade-Atara.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVK2-V5NM].
147. Grossman & Lai, supra note 28, at 379.
148. NOLADE, supra note 146, at 3.
149. Rachel Bluth, Trump's Promise to Rein in Drug Prices Could Open Floodgate to Importation Laws, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (March 22, 2017), https://khn.org/news/trumpspromise-to-rein-in-drug-prices-could-open-dam-to-importation-laws/
[https://perma.cc/8RPYNGNW] ("Many previous bills to allow importation or to allow Medicare to negotiate prices
for its beneficiaries have failed in the face of $1.9 billion in congressional lobbying by the
pharmaceutical industry since 2003 . . . ."); Rene J. Theriault III, Drug Reimportation:Prescription, Placebo, or Poison?, LEDA AT HARV. L. SCH. (Apr. 2002), https://dash.harvard.edu/
bitstream/handle/1/8846805/theriault.html?sequence=2
[https://perma.cc/TB62-ZDAC]
('The L.A. Times reported that the bill 'was so riddled with potential loopholes that even
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and Drug Safety Act-was introduced in the early 2000s. To be implemented, the bill had to gain approval of the Secretary of HHS, who at
that time was Donna Shalala. 5 0 Her approval was contingent upon a
finding that the Act would result in substantial taxpayer savings and
would not pose a greater threat to public safety than the previous rule.
She ultimately decided that it did not meet these qualifications, indicating that safety was a major concern.' 5
One of the most recent attempts-the Affordable and Safe Prescription Drug Importation Act-was introduced by Senators Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), and Bob Casey (D-Penn.). 5 2 But the
bill was met with strong opposition for its focus on importing only Canadian drugs for a trial period and for its failure to address safety concerns.1 53 The bill never passed the committee stage.1 5 4
While attempts have failed, abuse continues. One estimate indicated that "[i]n 2016, about 19 million Americans purchased pharmaceuticals illegally from foreign sources through online pharmacies or
while traveling." 5 5 U.S. consumers need access to less expensive medicines, and the FDA should provide this access in a more structured
and monitored way-rather than through narrow exceptions or discretionary rules that have been blatantly abused. This is achievable
through a well-crafted exception for parallel traders and coordination
with the European Union.

some of its most ardent opponents acknowledge privately they could no longer tell what, if
anything, it would do.'" (footnote omitted)).
150. Abraham N. Saiger, In Search ofa Government That Will Govern: Senate Bill 812
and Reimporting PrescriptionMedication from Canada, 12 ELDER L.J. 177, 197 (2004).
151. Laurie McGinley, Shalala Declines to Implement Law on Importing Prescription Drugs, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2000, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/

SB977872635716464949 [https://perma.cc/K3QM-LAKX].
152. Affordable and Safe PrescriptionDrugImportationAct Introducedto Help Lower Skyrocketing Cost of Medicine, BERNIE SANDERS (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/affordable-and-safe-prescription-drug-importation-act-introducedto-help-lower-skyrocketing-cost-of-medicine [https://perma.cc/ED6U-BHWW].
153. Leona Aglukkaq, Dear Bernie Sanders: Canadais Not the United States'Drugstore,
WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/
2017/05/12/dear-bernie-sanders-canada-is-not-americas-drug-store/?noredirect=on&utm-

term=.7b9e89befO2

[https://perma.cc/VKM3-T6MT];

Zaid Jilani & David Dayen, Cory

Booker Joins Senate Republicans To Kill Measure To Import Cheaper Medicine From Canada, INTERCEPT (Jan. 12, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/01/12/cory-booker-joins-senaterepublicans-to-kill-measure-to-import-cheaper-medicine-from-canada/
[https://perma.cc/4V6J-

6HPW].
154. S. 469, 115th Cong. (2017).
155. Emily Kopp & Rachel Bluth, Nonprofit Working to Block Drug Imports Has Ties
to Pharma Lobby, NPR (Apr. 18, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/20 17/04/18/524363014/nonprofit-working-to-block-drug-imports-has-ties-to-pharmalobby [https://perma.cc/9JRW-7MC9].
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PARALLEL IMPORTATION ACHIEVABLE UNDER THE
CURRENT SYSTEM

A.

Carving Out an Exception for ParallelTrade

As Part V indicates, the FDA has fairly strict regulations on the
importation of drugs. The current regulations foreclose PPT in the
United States. However, changes in the current scheme could lead to
scenarios in which parallel importation would be legal. The following
is an example which will help illustrate and guide the discussion:
Originator (a drug manufacture) produces.. X (its newly patented drug) at a facility in Ireland. It has acquired approval from
the FDA to sell X in the United States, as well as approval from EU
health authorities to sell X within the European Union. The European Union and the United States have different labeling requirements for X, as is the case with every drug. The NDA for X lists the
Irish facility as the manufacturing facility for X (meaning the facility was FDA approved after an inspection). Originator authorizes
the sale of X for five dollars a pill in the United States, while selling
it for one dollar a pill in Ireland. Company A, a parallel trader, buys
substantial amounts of X in Ireland at the one-dollar price, with the
intention of selling it in the United States. However, this version of
X does not have the proper labeling to be sold in the United States
because it was originally labeled for sale in the European Union.
Then, Company A relabels X with proper FDA approved U.S. labels.
In this situation, can Company A legally sell the relabeled X in the
United States for three dollars? In other words, can they participate
in parallel trade?

After Lexmark, this would not run afoul of Originator's patent
rights because the authorized sale in Ireland exhausts those rights.
Thus, Company A is not in jeopardy of being sued by X's patent holder,
Originator in this example, for infringement. Moreover, Company A's
sale of X would not violate the ban on re-importation because X was
never manufactured in the United States.
Company A would need to comply with the FDA requirements regarding registration, because removing the EU label and placing the
U.S. label on X qualifies Company A as a repackager. 57 Specifically,

156.

Originators, like Pfizer, often license the rights to make their drugs to other manu-

facturing companies or to subsidiary corporations. See Tom Bergin & Kevin Drawbaugh,
How Pfizer has Shifted U.S. Profits Overseas for Years, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2015, 11:49 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pfizer-tax-insight/how-pfizer-has-shifted-u-s-profits-

overseas-for-years-idUSKCNOT51ZS20151116 [https://perma.cc/35J8-QEAT]. If these facilities and companies are listed on the NDA, the fact that another company manufactures the
drug is unlikely to result in a different outcome.
157.

FDA, IDENTIFYING TRADING PARTNERS, supra note 111, at 7 ('DSCSA defines re-
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Company A would have to apply and receive authorization from the
FDA to relabel the product with new labels and ensure that it was placing the proper U.S. label on X." Furthermore, the relabeling would
need to occur at an FDA approved facility. 59 If these requirements are
not met, Company A would fail to meet the authorized trading partner
requirements, negating its ability to sell to any traders in the United
States. Company A would also need to ensure that the buyer it sells X
to is an authorized trading partner under the DSCSA.
While burdensome, Company A could comply with the requirements above. The real issue for Company A would undoubtedly be ensuring that it was receiving and storing proper tracing information for
X. This is the major obstacle blocking PPT in the United States.
Under the March 2018 guidance document, Company A cannot accept ownership of X unless the previous owner provides Company A
with TI, TH, and a TS prior to, or at the time of, the sale. 6 0 Company
A would fail to comply with these requirements in this scenario because X was originally labeled for sale in the European Union. In other
words, Company A will not be able to accept ownership of X, because
the manufacturer will not be able to provide Company A with tracing
information for drugs originally labeled for European sale.
To further explain this problem, breaking down the U.S. tracking
requirements is helpful. Recall that the United States requires that a
drug's NDC number and lot number be included as two of the ten elements of TI.' 6 ' The National Drug Code number is a ten-digit code that
is used strictly in the U.S. tracking system.'62 It is broken down into
three segments: "The first set of numbers in the NDC identifies the
labeler (manufacturer, repackager, or distributer). The second set of
numbers is the product code, which identifies the specific strength,

packager in section 581(16) of the FD&C Act as'a person who owns or operates an establishment that repacks and relabels a product or package for - (A) further sale; or (B) distribution
without a further transaction.' Under section 510 of the FD&C Act . . . any person who owns
or operates any establishment that manufactures, prepares, propagates, compounds, or processes drugs . . . that are offered for import into the United States must be registered with
the FDA. This includes repackagers of drugs. Thus, such repackager establishments must
be registered in accordance with section 510 to be considered authorized trading partners."
(citations omitted)).

158.

See 21 U.S.C. § 360 (a)-(d), (i) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 1.95 (2017); see also FDA, supra

note 115, at 7.
159.

FDA, IDENTIFYING TRADING PARTNERS, supra note 111, at 7.

160.

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 113-54, § 582(e)(1)(A)(i), 127

Stat. 605 (2013); see also supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
161. For a review of the ten elements of information that TI must have, see supra text
accompanying note 130.
162.

IDAHO MMIS, NATIONAL DRUG CODES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.idmedicaid.com/

Reference/NDC%/20Format%/20for%/20Billing%/20PAD.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JEU-3M77].
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dosage . . . and formulation of a drug for a specific manufacturer. Finally, the third set . . . identifies package sizes and types." 6 3 The first
set is specific to the trading partner (similar to a name), while the
product and package code are assigned based on the product.1 64
The European Union mandates a different kind of serialization for
its products. Thus, a drug purchased for sale in European Union will
not be labeled with an NDC number or a U.S. lot number. For instance,
if a U.S. company is going to export drugs for sale to the European
Union, it needs to use a different identification system in order to comply with the European Union's tracing requirements. '6
1.

ParallelTrade CertificationNumber

Regulatory changes could be implemented to solve this roadblock.
To begin, new legislation should mandate any trader that plans to engage in parallel trade within the United States to have an extra approval from the FDA, in addition to gaining approval to be a repackager, wholesaler, or other trading partner. It would require each company to be registered specifically as a parallel trader.
Most importantly, the legislation must allow the parallel traderCompany A-to purchase X without the manufacturer having to provide the tracing information. Instead, an exception should be carved
out to allow Company A to accept ownership of a drug from a manufacturer who does not supply it with TI, TH, and a TS prior to the
sale, if Company A creates a "PT Certification Number" for the transaction and provides it to subsequent buyers along with the other tracing requirements.
The PT Certification Number would alleviate Company A's need to
buy from a manufacturer that provides it with tracing information.
The PT Certification Number would be in bar-code format and would
indicate what facility the drug was purchased from, what the product
is, how much was purchased, the strength and dosage of the product,
and the date of the transaction. Company A would need to record and
store this information for six years.
While this PT Certification Number would essentially take the
place of Company A having to record tracing information in the original transaction with the foreign manufacturer, Company A would still
need to provide tracing information to subsequent buyers in order to
comply with the remaining DSCSA requirements. It is at this juncture
that United States coordination with the European Union becomes
critical.

163.

Id.

164.

Id.

165.

Souza, supra note 119.
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2. Mutual FacilitiesList
Company A will need to provide subsequent purchasers with TI (including an NDC and lot number), TH, and a TS, but in the transaction
with the manufacturer Company A created a PT Certification Number.
Thus, it would not have a NDC or lot number. Therefore, the legislation would have to allow parallel traders to create their own NDC numbers and lot numbers for products they buy with PT Certification Numbers. Once created, Company A would have proper tracing information
necessary to make subsequent sales in the United States.
When selling the relabeled product, Company A will provide the
purchasers with the PT Certification Number and newly created TI,
TH, and a TS. The TI, TH and TS that Company A will pass along in
subsequent transactions will look slightly different from the typical
transaction, because Company A never received tracing information
from the manufacturer.
To meet this standard, Company A requires all the information necessary to create TI, TH, and a TS for subsequent transactions. In the
past, attempts to authorize parallel trade have been unsuccessful, in
part, because of a failure to acknowledge or plan for the difficulties
parallel traders would face in trying to acquire the information necessary to create U.S. labels or tracing information. 66 Coordination with
European authorities could alleviate this issue.
The legislative change shall require the FDA and the European
Medicines Agency (EMA)16 7 to create a "Mutual Facilities List." The
list would be compiled jointly by the organizations and posted on a
designated internet site.'68 Any manufacturing facility that is authorized under both an FDA NDA and a centralized EMA marketing-authorization application 69 will be placed on the list. In other words, only

166.

Theriault III, supra note 149, at nn.72-74.

167. The EMA is a centralized agency that helps to facilitate and coordinate the evaluation
and approval of medicinal products in the European Union. See About Us: What We Do,
EUROPEAN
MEDS. AGENCY,
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/aboutus/

general/general content9000091.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac0580028a42 [https://perma.cc/G857-PDB2].
168. Senator Sanders's most recent attempt at sanctioning parallel trade, Bill S. 469,
had a similar website provision. See supra note 154 ("The Secretary shall publish on a dedicated Internet Web site a list of certified foreign sellers, including the Internet Web site
address, physical address, and telephone number of each such certified foreign seller.").
169. In the European Union, there are several different paths that companies can take
in getting a drug approved. The centralized EMA approval process is one such path. "The
centralized process is controlled through the EMA. Every member state of the EU is represented on the EMA Committee for Medicinal Products, which issues a single license [allowing the holder to sell] in all EU member states." Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs and Devices
Comparison of European and U.S. Approval Processes, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSACTIONAL

SCI. 399, 400 (2016), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/piilS2452302X16300638
[https://perma.cc/6CPD-N39Q]; see also U. Nitin Kashyap et al., Comparison of Drug Ap-
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facilities that manufacture drugs for sale in both the United States
and the European Union will be on the list. Moreover, the list will indicate which drugs (by proprietary and established name) are approved for sale in the European Union and United States and are produced at the facilities. This information is crucial to allowing parallel
traders to create tracing information for future transactions, including
NDC and lot numbers.
The list would be an exhaustive list of the facilities that parallel traders could purchase from, ensuring that parallel traders are buying from
safe and secure manufacturers. Since all of the facilities on the list would
be FDA approved, the manufacturers selling drugs made in a facility on
the list would be authorized trading partner under the FDCA.
With the "Mutual Facilities List," parallel traders would have the
information necessary to create tracing information for later sales. The
list would have the European and U.S. names of the drugs that are
made at each facility. With these names, parallel traders will be able
to make an NDC number for future transactions. The FDA publishes
a National Drug Code Directory, which list NDC numbers for every
drug and the Directory is "updated daily." 70 Once a parallel trader has
the EU name of the product and the name of the United States equivalent, looking up the right NDC will just be a matter of searching the
Excel spreadsheet that the FDA provides.' 7
With the proper NDC and lot number, parallel traders will be able
to provide subsequent buyers in the United States with proper tracing
information. The tracing information that the parallel trader provides
will follow the product through the supply chain. At any point in the
supply chain, traders or the FDA will be able to track the drug back to
the parallel trader using the tracing information. Although the tracing
information will not be traceable back to the manufacturer, the PT
Certification Number-which will be transferred to subsequent buyers
along with standard tracing information-will allow regulators and
traders to track the product's origins.
3.

Liability

Parallel traders would be liable for falsifying a PT Certification
Number or if a PT Certification Number was not accurate. The provision could place both civil liability and criminal liability on the parallel
proval Process in United States & Europe, 5 J. PHARM. SCI. & RES. 131, 133-34 (2013) (describing the "regulatory steps to go through before a drug is approved to be marketed in the
European Union").
170. See National Drug Code Directory, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucml42438.htm [https://perma.cc/QK6E-H7HF].
171. See id.
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traders for failure to meet the requirements. This is in line with the
DSCSA provision making it both a crime and a violation of the DSCSA
to falsify tracing information. 7 2
B. Feasibilityof the Changes
1. Creationof PT CertificationNumber, NDC Number, and Lot
Number
Requiring that parallel traders create a PT Certification Number,
NDC numbers, and lot numbers is not a stretch from what is currently
required of them under the existing system. Notably, the FDA notes
that there are currently "situations where trading partners are permitted by law to provide other trading partners with product tracing
information that omits certain elements that would otherwise be required."1 7 3 Parallel trade would simply be another one of those situations, but the omitted tracing information would be replaced with a PT
Certification Number. Moreover, under the current system, repackagers are already required to use their own NDC numbers for initial
transactions when buying from foreign or U.S. manufacturers that
have labeled the product for sale in the United States. 7 4 For example,
the FDA states that, "repackagers that are creating the first transaction information for the product they are introducing into commerce
should use their [own] NDC number."' 7 5
Lot numbers function the same way as NDC numbers. When a repackager receives a product from a manufacturer, it often changes the
entire package-breaking it down into smaller packages for further
sale. 7 6 These new packages require new lot numbers. In these situations, the FDA mandates that the repackager "use the new lot number
[they created] in the transaction information that it provides to subsequent purchasers." 7 7
In other words, repackagers are often providing subsequent buyers
and manufacturers with NDC and lot numbers that are unique to the
repackager; these numbers do not match the NDC and lot numbers
that the manufacturers supplied to repackager. Thus, an exception allowing repackagers to make their own NDC and lot numbers when
buying a product originally labeled for sale in the European Union

172.

See FDA, DSCSA IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 126, at 18.

173.

FDA, STANDARDIZATION OF DATA, supra note 127, at 2 (emphasis added).

174. Id. at 8.
175. Id.
176.

INSIDE EU FMD AND THE DELEGATED ACTS: A COMPLIANCE PRIMER 15 (2016),

https://www.tracelink.com/uk/_assets/pdf/inside-eu-fmd-and-the-delegated-acts-uk.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MW8F-GHRC].
177.

See FDA, DSCSA IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 126, at 9.
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doesn't stray far from the current system-repackagers make their
own lot and NDC numbers already.
The responsibility would be on the repackager to demonstrate that
the label and packaging is the only difference between the drug they
are relabeling for sale in the United States and its equivalent that was
originally labeled for sale in the United States. This statutory crave
out will only allow for the parallel importation of FDA approved drugs
manufactured in FDA approved facilities on the "Mutual Facilities
List"-the PT Certification Number will ensure that repackagers can
demonstrate this in further sales.
2. ForeignManufacturing
Given the complexity of the regulations and the required alterations to the current scheme, it is valid to question whether the scenario
described in the example above occurs frequently enough to warrant
the changes.
While U.S. drugs are often made domestically, the United States is
the largest importer of pharmaceuticals in the world. 7 8 "In fact,
136,400 foreign facilities from more than 150 countries export FDAregulated products to the United States."' 7 9 The United States imported about $86 billion dollars in pharmaceuticals in 2015-roughly
40 percent by volume of the finished drugs sold in the United States
are imported.'8 0
U.S. drugs are manufactured in many countries, but the United
States imports mostly from Ireland, Germany, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland and India. There are a lot of FDA approved facilities in
Ireland. 8 2 Factoring in the growth rate of imports in recent years and

178.

Ari Altstedter, Where the U.S. Actually Gets Its Drug Supply: QuickTake Q&A,

BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-17/where-theu-s- actually-gets-its-drug-supply-quicktake-q-a [https://perma.cc89RS-TP95] ("[T]he $86
billion of medicine brought in from the rest of the world in 2015 still makes the U.S. the
biggest drug importer on the planet.").
179. FDA Globalization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/
InternationalPrograms/FDABeyondOurBordersForeignOffices/ [https://perma.cc/9QQX-UL4X].
180. Thomas J. Bollyky & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Can Importation Address High Generic
Drug Prices? 12 (Hutchins Center, Working Paper No. 29, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2017/05/wp29_bollykykesselheim-drugimportation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/

8GXK-K2XG]; see also Howard Sklamberg & Michael Taylor, In India, With Our Sleeves Rolled
Up, FDA VOICE (March 18, 2015), https:/Iblogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/tag/globalization/
[https://perma.cc/6KRA-ZCKC].
181.

Altstedter, supra note 178.

182. See Elaine Burke, Ireland is a Home for 24 of the World's Top Biotech and Pharma
Companies, SILICON REPUBLIC (May 29, 2017), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/careers/
biotech-pharma-companies-ireland [https://perma.cc/PV7K-86RF]; Altstedter, supra note 178.
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the FDA's stance on lowering the barriers for approving foreign facilities,' 83 the number of FDA-approved foreign facilities and the number
of drugs being manufactured outside of the United States is likely to
continue growing.18 4
Thus, it is probable that FDA approved facilities are, and will continue to be, manufacturing drugs for sale in foreign countries, which
could be sold within the United States with implementation of the
changes laid out above. In a boarder sense, it seems logical considering
that the United States is already importing the same drugs from the
FDA-approved facilities that would be on the "Mutual Facilities
List"-the only difference between the parallel traded drug is that it
was labeled or packaged differently.
3.

Coordinationbetween the FDA and ELA

No nationally-implemented legislation could require the European
Union to cooperate in creating a "Mutual Facilities List." The European Union would have to agree to it willingly. If the United States
proposed such an initiative, there is reason to believe the European
Union would join in the effort. A coordination between the FDA and
EMA in creating the "Mutual Facilities List" is in line with the United
States and European Union's collaboration in the Mutual Recognition
Agreement. 8 5

In 2017, the EMA and the FDA agreed to enter into a Mutual Recognition Agreement, which allows U.S. and EU regulators to "utilize
each other's good manufacturing practice inspections of pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities." 8 6 Both the FDA and EMA must inspect

manufacturing facilities to ensure that they are in compliance with
regulatory requirements, and for drug approval. The Agreement "allows for recognition of each other's inspection outcomes and hence for
better use of inspection expertise and resources." 8 7 FDA Commis-

sioner Scott Gottlieb, commented on the agreement:
183. See Press Release, FDA, Mutual Recognition Promises New Framework for
Pharmaceutical Inspections for United States and European Union (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm544357.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q6W7-TJ33].
184. See David C. Gibbons & Dara Katcher Levy, FDA is Driving the Manufactureof Drug
Products Outside the United States, FDA L. BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
20 18/03/fda-is-driving-the-manufacture-of-drug-products-outside-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/2PLV-7LFU].
185. See Press Release, FDA, supra note 183; see also Press Release, EMA, EU-US mutual recognition of Inspections of Medicines Manufacturers Enters Operational Phase (Oct.
31, 2017), http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/newsandevents/news/2017/10/
news detail_002842.jsp&mid=WCObOlac58004d5c1 [https://perma.cc/39G6-XXUV].
186. Press Release, FDA, supra note 183.
187. Press Release, EMA, supra note 185.
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"

At a time in which medical product manufacturing is truly a
global enterprise, there is much to be gained by partnering with regulatory counterparts to reduce duplicative efforts and maximize
global resources while realizing the greatest bang for our collective
inspectional buck. ... By partnering with these countries we can
create greater efficiencies and better fulfill our public health goals,
relying on the expertise of our colleagues . . .

The Agreement demonstrates that the European Union and
United States are dedicated to providing safe drugs and promoting
public health through cooperation. A "Mutual Facilities List" would
be another step in this direction. Countries and regions where parallel products are exported may not be interested in facilitating that
parallel trade, because it often correlates with an increase in the
price of the product for their citizens.' 9 However, the European Union may be incentivized to help with the coordination and implementation of the "Mutual Facilities List," being that it will promote transparency and information sharing that consumers and traders in the
industry deserve.
The FDA and the EMA already have a great relationship, and a
"Mutual Facilities List" would further solidify this relationship. The
Mutual Recognition Agreement has fostered safety of drug trading and
improved efficiency-a move to a "Mutual Facilities List" would be in
line with that. Moreover, manufacturers could be incentivized to agree
to the creation of a "List" if there was a provision allowing any manufacturer who is on the "List" to have expedite inspections.
4.

Willingness to Enter Heavily Regulated Market

Lastly, it is quite evident that a change allowing for PPT will have
no effect on U.S. pharmaceuticals prices if importers are unwilling to
enter the market. Fortunately, importers stand to make profits from
this process. 90 This attractive monetary incentive should make it unlikely for companies with the proper resources to shy away from participating in PPT (if they could legally do so). As Professor Fredrick
Abbott, the Edward Ball Eminent Scholar, notes, filling this role will
be especially enticing to large corporations with a foothold in global
markets and access to global supply chains, such as Amazon, Costco,

188. Press Release, FDA, FDAtakes unprecedented step toward more efficient global pharmaceutical manufacturing inspections (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm583057.htm [https://perma.cc/CY7V-W9L6].
189. See Bordoy & Jelovac, supra note 64, at 7.
190. See HHS TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 79, at 67-69 (claiming benefits to consumers from parallel importation would be modest, because "intermediaries (exporters/importers) will take a large portion of the price differences").
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and Walmart.' 9 Not only would U.S. consumers benefit for these companies in engaging in PPT, but the companies are likely to as well.
These companies are known for taking advantage of price discrimination and profiting from imports. 9 2 Amazon has moved into the
healthcare industry and speculation has been swirling as to whether
it will take a role as a distributor.1 9 3 Moreover, Walmart and Costco
are already retail sellers of pharmaceutical goods.19 4 A transition into
this market would be easy for these companies considering that they
all "operate vast global supply chain[s] with sophisticated controls"; 9 5
"[e]ach understands the complexity of regulatory compliance and the
up-front expense that may be entailed in disrupting an existing market structure." 9 6
There have been complaints by traders who are already in the pharmaceutical industry regarding fears of updating their procedures to
meet the evolving DSCSA regulations.' 9 7 But having to comply with
these regulations should not deter big corporations from entering into
PPT. To be fair, the regulatory hurdles to becoming a trader in the
industry are high, but compliance is not impossible. If slight regulatory changes are made allowing PPT in limited situations, companies
could certainly comply with tracking requirements.
By way of example, the state of California and even some localities
place very similar product-tracking requirements on marijuana manufacturers, processors, wholesalers, and dispensaries who apply for
permits to conduct business.'" The regulations require tracking marijuana from "seed-to-sale," similar to the way pharmaceuticals are

191.

See Abbott, Inside Views II, supra note 53.

192. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Walmart's Imports from ChinaDisplaced 400,000 Jobs, a Study
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/business/economy/
walmart-china-imports-job-losses.html [https://perma.cc/45H6-9BFS].
193. Eric Sagonowsky, Amazon Finally Moved Into Healthcare. What's Next for
Pharma?, FIERCEPHARMA (Jan 31, 2018. 11:42 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharmal
amazon-finally-moved-into-healthcare-but-its-pharma-ambitions-are-still-far-from-clear
[https://perma.cc/4BXC-9SGW].
194.

Abbott, Inside Views II, supra note 53.

195.
196.

Id.
Id.

197.

Snyder, supra note 118.

198. See Commercial Medical CannabisTrack and Trace Program, HUMBOLDT COUNTY,
https://humboldtgov.org/2225/Track-and-Trace[https://perma.cc/S9Y6-UYET] (discussing
the tracing program that Humboldt County, CA requires as a condition for receiving a permit
to cultivate, distribute, or dispense marijuana within county limits); see also Matt Leonard,
CaliforniaTracks MarijuanaFrom Seed to Sale, GCN (Jan. 12, 2018), https://gcn.com/articles/2018/01/12/california-cannabis-tracking-system. aspx
[https://perma.cc/BK7K-4HFA]
(discussing the tracking regulations implemented at the state level).
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tracked under the DSCSA.' 99 New businesses trying to comply with
these regulations will usually purchase systems-such as BioTrackTHC-to help them comply with the product tracking requirements.2 0 0
Services like BioTrackTHC are not necessarily cheap, but they provide
the infrastructure to easily implement product tracking and labeling
procedures.
If these small local businesses are able to comply with operating
procedures and tracking requirements that the state of California and
other localities have implemented, it should not be difficult for companies with significant resources and experience in heavily regulated industries to comply with the DSCSA. In fact, potential parallel traders
can rely on companies like GS1 US, who freely posts lists of companies,
products, and services similar to BioTrackTHC, which specializes in
helping companies comply with the DSCSA.2 0
Significantly, if companies like Costco, Amazon, or Walmart enter
into PPT, they may be able to bypass these aids-cutting out the extra
cost-because they already use sophisticated storage, tracking, and information sharing systems in their current business models.2 0 2 Moreover, the incremental implementation of the tracking regulations has
created a prime opportunity for parallel traders to step in. Over the
next couple of years, all of the traders in the pharmaceutical industry
will have to divert resources to adapt their systems to meet the new
regulations.

199.

Catherine Goldberg, Everything You Need to Know About Seed to Sale Technology,

GREEN MARKET REP. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.greenmarketreport.com/everything-you-

need-to-know-about-seed-to-sale-technology/ [https://perma.cc/VTJ3-XH5A]; see also Jake
Methow, How California's New Medical MarijuanaRules Track Seed-to-Sale Laws, POT
VALET (May 5, 2017), https://www.potvalet.com/blog/how-californias-new-medical-marijuanarules-track-seed-to-sale-laws/ [https://perma.cc/9923-K6ND].
200. Processing and Manufacturing Business Solution, BIOTRACKTHC, https://
www.biotrack.com/cannabis-processing/ [https://perma.cc/EGC9-QZES] ("Record the necessary data for compliance, save time and increase transparency to your licensed cannabis
operation."); see also Goldberg, supra note 199 (noting that "the cannabis industry has
adopted the latest systems management technology offered by a variety of specialized vendors to implement . . . 'seed-to-sale' system[s] that track[] products").
201. Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) - for PharmaceuticalWholesalers: Who
Can Help? GS 1 (Oct. 28, 2015), at 3-7, https://www.gslus.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/
DMX/Download.aspx?Command=CoreDownload&Entryld=623&language=en-US&Portalld=
0&Tabld=134 [https://perma.cc/N7F7-NMLU].
202. See Syed Ali Ameer, Inventory Management: How Costco Aggressively Manages Inventory to Thrive in Tough Times, LINKEDIN (Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/inventory-management-how-costco-aggressively-manages-thrive-ameer
[https://perma.cc/
S2DP-KGLV] ("Costco . . employs a just-in-time inventory management system, which includes sharing data directly with many of its largest suppliers. Companies like KimberlyClark calculate re-order points in real time and send new inventory, as needed, to replenish
store shelves.").
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PPT will only be allowed in limited circumstances, even with the
implementation of the change. But the discussion above demonstrates
that PPT in the United States is feasible, and hopefully it will lead
politicians, companies, advocacy groups, and concerned citizens to
fight for the changes that will make PPT possible. Indeed, this presents large companies-ones that are often labeled negatively as "big
business"203-With the opportunity to lobby and fight for changes that
will help U.S. consumers struggling with high drug prices. Moreover,
this presents the Trump Administration with the opportunity to take
action to follow through with its campaign promise of lowering drug
prices. 2 0 4 As an incentive, these efforts could lead to increased profits
for the companies and an enhanced public image for both the companies and the Trump Administration.
VII.

ADDITIONAL BARRIERS

Unfortunately, the present regulatory scheme is not the only road
block to successful implementation of PPT in the United States. If the
suggested changes are made, strong political opposition and other hurdles may present problems to the implementation of a successful PPT
system. This Part analyzes the legitimacy of some of these barriers
and discusses the threat each poses to PPT in the United States. The
list below is not meant to be exhaustive, but addresses some of the
most pressing issues.
A. Domestic Price Controls
Currently in the United States, price controls are not a threat to the
implementation of PPT. Moreover, if changes are made to allow PPT,
then price controls are unlikely to pose a threat to companies looking to
enter in to the parallel trade business. An overwhelming majority of advanced nations have some direct regulatory oversight of the prices set
for pharmaceuticals within their borders.2 0 These countries sacrifice a

203. See, e.g., Kate Taylor, Amazon is the New Walmart: The E-Commerce Giant Is Increasingly Becoming a Symbol for Everything Wrong with Big Business, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2017,
9:40 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-is-the-new-walmart-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/
N6V8-HHS3] ("Walmart was once considered the symbol of everything that was wrong with

the retail industry. Now, Amazon is taking on that undesirable role."). Many individuals,
including this author, do not share these views; in fact, Walmart has made important strides
in the environmental context. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Implicationsof PrivateEnvironmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 117, 118, 132-33 (2014). However, the
fact remains that a segment of the public has a negative view of big businesses, and positive
publicity could sway, or at least affect, these opinions.
204. La Monica, supra note 3.
205. Kesselheim et al., supra note 11, at 860; ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 11, at 22.
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free market by setting price limitations on drugs in order to secure affordable prices for consumers.2 0
The United States is the outlier. Compared to the rest of the world,
U.S. prices are fairly unregulated.2 0 ' Here, drug prices in the private
sector are not subjected to regulation at the federal level.2 0 Moreover,
pharmaceuticals sold through parallel trade would be priced lower
than the drugs sold by originators.2 0 9 Thus, if the United States were
to enact price controls, the only controls that would have a prohibitive
effect on PPT would be those that set a minimum price at which a
product could be sold.
This lack of price regulation may change in the future. The U.S.
government certainly has the authority to set price controls. Obviously, regulation of prices by the federal government would not violate the international agreements that the United States has obligations under, nor would it violate domestic law.21 0 However, given the
government's reluctance to regulate prices in the past and the enormous political obstacles standing in the way, it seems unlikely that
the United States will set controls in response to efforts that are
aimed at lowering prices. In fact, if the implementation of adequate
price controls were practical, discussion of parallel trade would likely
be unnecessary.
B.

Safety Concerns

There are some who argue that the sanctioning of parallel trade will
lead to the importation of counterfeit or poor-quality drugs.2 1 ' While
drug quality and safety is one of the most-if not the most-important
aspects of the pharmaceutical trade, PPT sanctioned under the
changes suggested above is unlikely to reduce drug quality or cause
increased safety concerns.
206. Lana Kraus, Medication Misadventures: The Interaction of InternationalReference
Pricingand ParallelTrade in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527,
532-33 (2004).
207. Abbott, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals,supra note 19, at 160-62; see also William Davis, The Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000: Releasing Gray Market Pharmaceuticals, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 483, 507 (2001).
208. GAO: BRAND-NAME PRICING, supra note 15, at 8. Pharmaceutical originators are
subject to federal enforcement if their prices or actions violate antitrust laws. For discussion
on this topic, see Frederick M. Abbott, Excessive PharmaceuticalPrices and Competition
Law: Doctrinal Development to Protect Public Health, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 281, 289-95
(2016).
209. See supra Part V.
210. Abbott, ParallelTrade in Pharmaceuticals,supra note 19, at 161.
211. See Bryan A. Liang, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals:Injecting the Counterfeit
Element into the PublicHealth, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 847 (2005); Davis, supra note
208, at 502; see also Kopp & Bluth, supra note 155.
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Past legislation aimed at sanctioning PPT has failed because health
authorities could not guarantee the quality of the imported drugs.
The proposal suggested above alleviates these increased safety concerns. Under these changes, parallel traders would still have to comply
with safety requirements that the FDA already has in place for regularly imported drugs. The beauty of these complicated regulations is
that they are designed specifically to ensure quality and safety. 2 1 3
First, drugs brought in through PPT will be manufactured in the
same facilities and consist of the same ingredients as drugs that
U.S. consumers are currently taking; the imported drugs will need
to be manufactured and handled in FDA-approved facilities-ones
which are inspected for quality purposes. 2 1 4 Second, the imported
drugs will be tracked throughout the supply chain, assuring
knowledge of where, how, and who manufactured or came into contact with the drugs.2 " Lastly, the regulations require each trading
partner to have a system in place for identifying suspect or illegitimate products and notifying FDA and trading partners when such
a product is detected.2 1 6
Considering the requirements that the FDA has in place, it is
doubtful that PPT will introduce safety concerns that are not already
present for all drugs imported into the United States. The FDA's requirements will ensure the quality of parallel imported drugs, just as
they do now for drugs imported with the patent holder's permission.
C. Defensive Measures by Patent Holders
The biggest risk to PPT in the United States comes from those who
will face increased competition from its implementation. No company
would stand idly by in the face of lost profits. It would be naive to think
that the originator industry will be an exception. The suggestions
above would strip the originators of their pricing monopoly-and they
have the funds and savvy to put up a fight.

212. Laurie McGinley, ShalalaDeclines to Implement Law on Importing Drugs, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 27, 2000), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB977872635716464949 [https://perma.cc/

L5WV-BR83].
213. See FDA, supra note 108 ("[The DSCSA] will enhance FDA's ability to help protect
consumers from exposure to drugs that may be counterfeit, stolen, contaminated, or otherwise harmful. The system will also improve detection and removal of potentially dangerous
drugs from the drug supply chain to protect U.S. consumers.").
214.

See supra Section V.B.

215.

See supra note Section V.B.2.

216.

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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Lobbying

First and foremost, any suggested change to authorize PPT will face
opposition right out of the gate. The industry will certainly lobby
against any legislative change. There has been strong lobbying against
foreign drug imports in the past,2 1 7 and this proposal would be met
with lobbying as well. While this proposal would face the same opposition as past attempts, it does not have to meet the same fate.
This proposal mandates that drugs sold through PPT will comply
with the tracing and safety regulations currently in place. This will
lessen the potency of the safety concern argument, which lobbyists relied on heavily to inhibit past attempts.2 1 8 Moreover, if the large companies that could profit in the role of parallel traders back the proposed
legislation, it would greatly increase the bill's chances. 219 Parallel importation legislation has come close in the past;2 2 0 with enhanced support and emphasis on safety, this proposal may be able to withstand
opposition lobbying.
2. Limitations on Supply
If these changes are implemented, the originator industry could employ supply-limiting techniques to squeeze out parallel trade in a more
indirect fashion. Originators will likely utilize contractual provisions
and general limitations on production in hopes of cutting parallel traders off from lower-priced drugs, or to retain a right to sue the parallel
traders for selling the drugs in the United States.
In addressing contractual restrictions, the example provided in
Part VII.A is useful. Originators often license out the patent rights allowing others to produce the drug for a fee.2 2 ' If an originator or one of
its subsidiaries owns and operates a manufacturing facility, they could
place post sale contractual restrictions on all drugs labeled for sale in
Europe (or any country other than the United States). The restrictions
would likely aim to limit the purchaser's right to relabel the drugs for
sale in the United States. Back to the example, if Company A purchased the drug with these contractual restrictions, selling the drug in

217. Bluth, supra note 149; see also Jilani & Dayen, supra note 153 ("Booker and some
of his Democratic colleagues who opposed the Sanders amendment are longtime friends of
the drug industry. As MapLight data shows, Booker has received more pharmaceutical manufacturing cash over the past six years than any other Democratic senator: $267,338.").
218.

Bluth, supra note 149; see also Jilani & Dayen, supra note 153.

219.

See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.

220.

See Jilani & Dayen, supra note 153.

221. Bergin & Drawbaugh, supra note 156; see also Abbott, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals, supra note 19, at 155.
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the United States may constitute a breach of the sales contract-subjecting them to a lawsuit.
These post sale contractual restrictions are not uncommon. Recall
that similar defensive measures were employed by Lexmark in Impression Products v Lexmark.22 2 Lexmark placed post-sale/single-use restrictions in the sales contracts for their toner cartridges, prohibiting
the original purchaser from reselling to a remanufacturer. 2 2 3 However,
Lexmark could not rely on the contractual protections to sue the remanufacturers (such as Impression Products) for breach of contract
because Lexmark never entered into a contractual agreement with remanufacturers; Lexmark was only in privity with the individual consumers who were reselling the cartridges to the remanufacturers. 224
Lexmark could have sued the individual consumers who they had sales
agreements with for breach of contract,22 ' but this would have been
economically unwise-which is likely what led Lexmark to make the
patent infringement claims.
By contrast, if a parallel trader purchases a drug from an originator
manufacturer and the agreement contains post-sale contractual restrictions against selling the drug in the United States, the restrictions
would be enforceable; the parties would be in privity. Thus, if the parallel trader resold the drug within the United States, the manufacturer could sue the trader for breach of contract.22 6
Moreover, if the originators license out the patent rights, allowing
others to produce the drug, they could place contractual restrictions in
the licensee agreements. These restrictions would likely condition the
license to manufacture the drug on the licensee not selling to traders
who intend to resell the drug in the United States.227 The effectiveness
of these provisions remains to be seen.

222.

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

223.

See text accompanying notes 41 & 49.

224.

Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc.,

137 S. Ct. 1523, 1530 (2017)

("Lexmark's contractual single-use/no-resale agreements were with the initial customers,
not with downstream purchasers like the remanufacturers."); see also supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
225. See id. at 1531 ("The single-use/no-resale restrictions in Lexmark's contracts with
customers may have been clear and enforceable under contract law.").

226.

See id.

227. These kinds of contractual provisions have been recommended as a way to guarantee that low-income countries that receive drugs under discount programs continue to receive
the low prices even when parallel trade is authorized. To be clear, if PPT is authorized in the
United States, efforts should be made to ensure that such trade does not interfere with lowincome countries' access to discounted medicine. For Professor Abbott's discussion on how to
combat this issue, see Brief for Professor Abbott, supra note 65, at 33-36; Abbott, Parallel
Trade in Pharmaceuticals,supra note 19, at 154-56, but the discussion should be continued
in further literature.
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Lastly, the originators could place general limitations on production.2 2' The pharmaceutical producers manufacturing in foreign facilities approved by the FDA are capable of much more substantial production.2 2 9 However, if PPT is authorized, manufacturers may try to
keep production low precisely to limit the pharmaceuticals that would
be available for parallel trade. In other words, originators would sell
only so much of their product as is necessary to meet "local demand,"
and "resulting shortages based on parallel exports would be a subject
for the national government to address." 2 3 0 In fact, originator companies have used this technique in Europe before. 2 3 ' This issue is, in part,
a competition law question. When challenges were brought against
this type of activity in Europe, "the [Court of Justice of the European
Union] . . . refused to prohibit th[e] practice as per se unlawful as a
matter of competition law." 2 3 2 However, the way that U.S. courts will
react to the activity remains to be seen.
These barriers are pressing issues, and this Article certainly does
not set out to solve them. They should, and likely will, be the topic of
future literature. However, one thing is for certain: these roadblocks
should not cause lawmakers, corporations, or citizens to abandon the
campaign to legalize PPT in the United States.
VIII. CONCLUSION

U.S. drug prices must be lowered. A majority of Americans, regardless of their political party, support importation as a way to
lower these prices. 2 3 3 This Article suggests a way in which parallel
importation of patented pharmaceuticals can be safely implemented.
But the road will not be easy-past attempts with similarly good intentions have faltered.
228. Michel, Consequences of SCOTUS Lexmark Decisionon ParallelDrug Imports: Exclusive Interview with ProfessorAbbott, FUDIABETES (June 4, 2017), https://forum.fudiabetes.org/
t/consequences-of-scotus-lexmark-decision-on-parallel-drug-imports-exclusive-interviewwith-professor-abbott/i 116 [https://perma.cc/EQ24-BHR7] ('Pharmaceutical originators will
not expand overseas supplies to fill new demand for parallel imports in the United States.
Some of the bills introduced in Congress try to address potential efforts to restrict the quantity of goods available for parallel trade, but this is a difficult business, and in any case
remains to be seen.").
229.

Comment from Professor Abbott, on file with author.

230.

Abbott, ParallelTrade in Pharmaceuticals,supra note 19, at 160.

231. Id.
232.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

233. Dylan Scott, Trump's Abandoned Promise to BringDown DrugPrices, Explained, VOX
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Legislation to facilitate PPT in the United States will introduce
competition into the patented pharmaceutical market and should
lead to a decrease in prices. PPT will not be the single antidote to this
country's drug-pricing epidemic, but it will get the ball rolling. For
the millions of Americans struggling with high prices, progress has
to be made, and safe, efficient PPT is a great place to start.

